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Police Violence in The Wire
Jonathan Masur* and Richard H. McAdams**
Introduction
Police brutality—the unsanctioned, unlawful use of force by police against unarmed (and
often defenseless) civilians—is one of the recurring motifs of The Wire.1 The violence occurs in
a variety of settings: occasionally the victim of the police brutality has done something to
precipitate it (though the brutality is never justified), but more often the violence is unprovoked
and senseless. Some police are one-time wrongdoers; others are repeat offenders. Some officers
participate in the actual beatings, while others only cover up for the actions of their fellow
officers. But in sum, the violence is regular and recurring, if not omnipresent. In this respect, The
Wire is not dissimilar from other filmic depictions of police, such as NYPD Blue.
What is different is the cast of police officers who are involved in police brutality
throughout the show. That cast includes some of the worst police, such as Thomas “Herc” Hauk
and Anthony Colicchio. But it also includes some of the very best police officers on the force,
officers who in other contexts, in other moments, engage in remarkable acts of altruism and
generosity of spirit and who reject rule-breaking and lawlessness. Our goal is to explore these
and other depictions of police violence in The Wire. Unlike other cinematic portrayals, The
Wire’s explanation for police violence is not unidimensional. In The Wire, police violence is not
excused, as if it were the necessary action of police who need to use all of the tools at their
disposal to combat crime. Nor is it merely the product of a few “bad apples.” Rather, The Wire
describes how organizational dysfunction can lead decent people to do terrible things, and how
social context matters to crime—here, police crime. That is, it does for police violence what it
does for all the failures of contemporary urban institutions.
We see within The Wire four structural mechanisms behind police violence, beyond the
usual trope of bad apples on the force. First, there is the police code of loyalty: police operate
under norms that compel them to aggressively defend one another against both bodily harm and
legal responsibility for acts of violence or other violations. Second, this is toxically accompanied
by a need to project power and dominance in every situation. This dominance norm reflects a
hyper-masculinity common to police culture.
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A third causal mechanism is the War on Drugs. The Wire demonstrates how this “war” is
unwinnable, and how it asks police to accomplish objectives that are simply impossible. Police
efforts to realize these unobtainable objectives leads them in some cases to use violent and
unlawful tactics where the legal means available to them inevitably fall short. Fourth, and finally,
police departments (like all the institutions the show depicts) are afflicted by a collective action
problem. It is in the interest of the police department generally that citizens view the police as
treating them fairly and justly, and cooperate with the police as a result. But the individual
officer is the one who must engage in self-restraint, showing respect and minimizing the use of
force, while only enjoying a small sliver of the benefit, because those greater benefits redound to
the future reputation of the force as a whole. Once all of the officers realize that enough of their
colleagues will do things that damage the reputation of the force, it appears futile to engage in
self-restraint oneself.
If we (and The Wire) are correct about these causal mechanisms, the implication is that
rooting out police brutality will require more than firing or disciplining the bad apples on the
force. Rather, police departments will have to reverse the structural and institutional mechanisms
that encourage and reinforce the tendency toward police violence. This will mean wholesale
change in what police forces are attempting to accomplish, and how they go about meeting those
objectives.
Our article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we document and describe the incidents of
police violence in The Wire, particularly those incidents involving police whose motives and
actions are otherwise most generous or altruistic. In Part II, we explain the causal mechanisms
behind those incidents of violence. In Part III, we offer tentative suggestions for reform.
I.

The Incidence of Police Violence in The Wire

Season One of The Wire includes six separate incidents of police brutality. In the second
episode, just as the show is starting to gain steam, Roland Pryzbylewski (“Prez”) clubs Kevin
Johnston in the eye with the handle of his police-issued firearm, just because Johnston is leaning
on the police vehicle and smirking at the officers.2 Johnston ends up losing his eye. In the very
next episode, Preston Broadus (“Bodie”) punches Detective Patrick Mahon during a police raid.3
Several police officers—including Shakima Greggs (“Kima”), Herc, and Ellis Carver—beat
Bodie severely, to the point of unconsciousness.4 Two episodes later, Bodie has been re-arrested,
and Carver is interrogating him.5 Bodie mouths off to Carver, and Carver begins beating on him,
joined later by Herc. In the next episode, Bodie has been released from juvenile detention and is

2

The Wire: The Detail (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 2).
The Wire: The Buys (HBO television broadcast June 16, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 3).
4
Id.
5
The Wire: The Pager (HBO television broadcast June 30, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 5).
3
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spotted by Herc and Carver, who think he has unlawfully escaped.6 Herc again grabs him and
slams him on the ground, threatening to beat him even more severely. Bodie avoids this beating
only by proving that he has been lawfully released from detention. In the seventh episode,
Marquis Hilton (“Bird”) spews a string of vile invectives toward Kima and Jimmy McNulty.7 In
response, Lieutenant Cedric Daniels, Sergeant Jay Landsman, and Kima herself beat Bird to the
point of unconsciousness.8 Finally, in Episode Eleven, Reginald Cousins (“Bubbles”) is arrested
by police officers who think he might be involved in shooting Kima.9 When Bubbles does not
confess (because in fact he has done nothing wrong), Detective Vernon Holley begins beating on
him and is only stopped when another detective intervenes.10 That is just one season of five; the
others contain many more.
In addition to these examples of violence, there are multiple instances in which police
officers cover up violence committed by their fellow officers. Following Prez’s beating of
Johnston, Daniels instructs his subordinate Prez (as well as Herc and Carver) on how to lie about
the incident and goes so far as to feed him the story he should use:
No, Officer Pryzbylewski, he did not piss you off. He made you fear for your safety and
that of your fellow officers. I’m guessing now, but maybe, he was seen to pick up a bottle
and menace Officers Hauk and Carver, both of whom had already sustained injuries from
flying projectiles. . . . Maybe when he raised the bottle in a threatening manner, you used
a Kel-Lite, not the handle of your service weapon, to incapacitate the suspect. Go
practice. You fuck the bullshit up when you talk to internal, I can’t fix it. You’re on your
own.11
In Season Three, Officer Kenneth Dozerman of the Western District is shot while
engaging in an undercover drug purchase.12 Herc remarks to some fellow officers that if they
“catch up to him, he don’t come in alive.”13 The shooting suspect is subsequently captured, and
before he is taken downtown to be booked and put in jail, the police van containing the suspect
makes an “unscheduled stop” at Western District headquarters. There, Western District police
beat the suspect senseless merely as punishment for the fact that he (unknowingly) shot a police
officer. In the words of William Moreland (“Bunk”), they “mistook him for a piñata.”14 Bunk,
the detective assigned to the case, then helps cover up this unlawful act of police brutality. In his
official report describing the arrest of the suspect, he attributes the suspect’s obvious physical
6

The Wire: The Wire (HBO television broadcast July 7, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 6).
The Wire: One Arrest (HBO television broadcast July 21, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 7).
8
Id.
9
The Wire: The Hunt (HBO television broadcast Aug. 18, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 11).
10
Id.
11
The Wire: The Detail, supra note 2 (Season 1, Episode 2).
12
The Wire: All Due Respect (HBO television broadcast Sept. 26, 2004) (Season 3, Episode 2).
13
Id.
14
The Wire: Dead Soldiers (HBO television broadcast Oct. 3, 2004) (Season 3, Episode 3).
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injuries to the arrest itself, as if the suspect had fought with police while being arrested. This is a
lie, but Bunk nonetheless reads his report out loud with a smile: “Injuries were sustained while
patrol officers were effecting pursuit and arrest of aforementioned suspect[s].”15
Later in Season Three, Captain Howard Colvin (“Bunny”) is having difficulty convincing
the drug dealers in his district to move their operations to “Hamsterdam,” the designated areas he
has set aside in which dealing will be permitted. As a means of forcing the dealers to set up shop
in Hamsterdam, he instructs the officers under his command to engage in brutality and violence
against any dealers who refuse to move. He then assures them that he will help cover up and
defend them against any complaints of brutality:
They bring it here, or the other two free-zones, or you bang ’em senseless. Anything you
need to do, you do. Up to a body that can’t walk itself out of an emergency room, I’ll
back up you and your men. You understand me? . . . Whatever it takes.16
Following this statement is a montage of police violence that effectively creates Hamsterdam.
Several of the police officers who are seen beating civilians or helping to cover up
beatings are terrible, sadistic people, who degrade and dehumanize the people they are supposed
to protect. Officer Eddie Walker robs Randy Wagstaff and terrorizes other civilians before
eventually breaking the fingers of “Donut,” a twelve-year old car thief.17 Colicchio, after
engaging in violence against various drug traffickers and discussing how he would like to hurt
others, eventually pulls a teacher out of his car window for peacefully complaining that the
police have blocked traffic.18 Herc is “fighting the War on Drugs, one brutality case at a time,” in
Kima’s words.19 He racks up brutality complaint after brutality complaint and exhibits no
redeeming features other than loyalty to his fellow officers. These three are unfit to serve in any
police department. They are the canonical “bad apples.”
Yet Carver, Bunk, Kima, Bunny, and Daniels are not bad apples. They are decent human
beings who strive to do their policing work well. We see Carver agonize over his inability to help
Randy in Season Four;20 he ultimately has the courage to write up Colicchio for assaulting the
teacher in Season Five.21 By the standards of the show, Bunk qualifies as an upstanding
15

Id. Another example of police humor about police violence comes from Lt. Dennis Melo in a conversation with
Major Colvin in Season 3, Episode 3. Colvin says, “Ignorance is bliss, Lieutenant. Anyone ever tell you that?”
Mello replies: “Once, but I beat the dog-piss out of the guy with a night stick.” The Wire: Dead Soldiers, supra note
14 (Season 3, Episode 3).
16
The Wire: Homecoming (HBO television broadcast Oct. 31, 2004) (Season 3, Episode 6).
17
The Wire: Misgivings (HBO television broadcast Nov. 19, 2006) (Season 4, Episode 10).
18
The Wire: Transitions (HBO television broadcast Jan. 27, 2008) (Season 5, Episode 4).
19
The Wire: The Target (HBO television broadcast June 2, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 1).
20
The Wire: Final Grades (HBO television broadcast Dec. 10, 2006) (Season 4, Episode 13).
21
The Wire: Transitions, supra note 19.
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detective. He generally avoids cutting corners or engaging in illegal activity, and he seems
genuinely dedicated to the mission of reducing the number of homicides in Baltimore—witness
his impassioned speech castigating Omar for his involvement in so much killing.22 Kima
stubbornly refuses to pretend to identify one of Bunk’s suspects when she is shot in Season One,
refusing to take unlawful shortcuts.23 In Season Five, she has the courage to expose McNulty and
Lester Freamon for concocting a sexual serial killer. She also shows genuine concern and regard
for the citizens of Baltimore, most notably her confidential informant Bubbles; in Season One,
just before she is shot, she tries to help him kick his drug habit and start a new life (even though
this would end his usefulness as an informant).24
Bunny Colvin is one of the most noble and venerated characters in the show. He attempts
a rogue legalization of drugs to reform his police department and reduce drug-related violence,
and pays for it with his job.25 He gets fired from a hotel security job rather than let a wealthy
customer get away with assaulting a prostitute.26 He joins a project aimed at helping troubled
middle-schoolers and has the remarkable compassion to adopt the troubled “corner kid” Namond
Brice.
Finally, Daniels is perhaps one of the principal heroes of a show that almost entirely lacks
heroes. After initially appearing to place his own career prospects ahead of his public-serving
mission, he becomes in many ways (but not all) the model of a public-serving police officer. He
attempts to help save numerous kids from the streets, including Wallace and Kevin Johnston.
Over and over again, he fights to protect his cases, and the mission of reducing crime, against
interference from his superiors, often to his own career detriment.27 Daniels ultimately resigns
the top police position rather than run the force in the usual dysfunctional way. The viewer is
meant to like and empathize with Carver, Bunk, Kima, Bunny, and Daniels, and by the end of the
show most viewers do. All five of these characters are portrayed, plausibly, as the “good apples”
of the police force.
And yet all five of these individuals also engage in unlawful violence or help to cover it
up. Carver beats Bodie repeatedly in Season One,28 helps to cover up Prez’s brutality against
Kevin Johnston,29 and then in Season Three he threatens and then is involved in beating another

The Wire: Homecoming, supra note 16 (Season 3, Episode 6) (“And now all we got is bodies, and predatory
motherfuckers like you. And out where that girl fell, I saw kids acting like Omar, calling you by name, glorifying
your ass. Makes me sick, motherfucker, how far we done fell.”).
23
The Wire: The Hunt, supra note 9 (Season 1, Episode 11).
24
The Wire: The Cost (HBO television broadcast Aug. 10, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 10).
25
The Wire: Mission Accomplished (HBO television broadcast Dec. 19, 2004) (Season 3, Episode 12).
26
The Wire: Home Rooms (HBO television broadcast Sept. 24, 2006) (Season 4, Episode 3).
27
The Wire: The Wire, supra note 6 (Season 1, Episode 6).
28
The Wire: The Pager, supra note 6 (Season 1, Episode 5).
29
The Wire: The Detail, supra note 2 (Season 1, Episode 2).
22
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drug suspect.30 Bunk helps cover up the beating of the drug dealer who shot Dozerman. Kima
participates in the beatings of Bodie and Bird. Bunny authorizes his officers to use brutality and
violence against drug dealers who won’t move to Hamsterdam and promises to protect them
from internal investigations. Daniels helps cover up Prez’s violence and then participates in the
beating of Bird later in the same season.
Finally, although McNulty and Freamon certainly deserve their termination from the
force at the end of the series (and a criminal prosecution they avoid), The Wire leaves us with the
rich irony that these two are perhaps the only significant police characters in the show never
directly tainted by the use, endorsement, or concealment of police violence, and yet they are
among the very few police that the institution excludes. The violations that McNulty and
Freamon have committed are viewed by the police force as far more serious than the regular acts
of brutality in which nearly every other officer engages. Even when Herc is finally fired from the
police force in Season Four, it is not because of any of the acts of brutality he has engaged in.
The immediate cause was his fruitless car stop and search of a politically connected black
reverend. Although he handled the man more roughly than necessary, this was much gentler than
his handling of the non-politically connected Bodie—not an occasion of “splitting heads.”31 For
that reason, the new Mayor Carcetti would risk upsetting the police rank and file by terminating
Herc for “merely” a bad traffic stop. Instead, the Mayor authorizes a broader investigation of
Herc, who is ultimately fired for forging his supervisor’s signature when borrowing a
surveillance camera and then inventing a fake confidential informant to cover his tracks.32 The
implication is that the police force cares deeply about the preservation of certain norms—such as
not offending politically powerful constituencies, or perhaps honesty with one’s superiors—but
deterring police violence is not among them.
How audacious it is for The Wire to lure the viewer into admiring these characters but
also show them committing or condoning criminal violence against suspects. Part of the show’s
moral complexity is that the viewer inevitably comes to respect and empathize with some police
characters, even though nearly all of them are depicted as engaging in, endorsing, or covering up
excessive uses of force. The Wire forces us to consider how ordinarily decent people could
engage in or cover up such indecent, criminal acts. Of course, this is just par for the course for
the show, which also explores how non-police characters come to commit violent acts. But, for
the police, the show’s explanation is that the structure of the police organization channels
The Wire: Time after Time (HBO television broadcast Sept. 19, 2004) (Season 3, Episode 1) (“But if you make us
go into them weeds for you, or make us come back out here tomorrow night, catch you on the corner, I swear to
fuckin' Christ, we will beat you longer, and harder, than you beat your own dick!”).
31
See Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and the Irrelevance of Moral
Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019 (2004).
32
The Wire: That’s Got His Own (HBO television broadcast Dec. 3, 2006) (Season 4, Episode 12) (“Let me ask if
you remember pulling a surveillance camera from ISD, serial number AW466J-Niner. You remember that? We also
need to go over your paperwork on a couple of informants. So if you don’t mind coming back downtown with us . . .
.”).
30
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behavior in this direction. We see quite a few causal mechanisms in The Wire, some on the
surface, some a bit deeper. The next Part examines and explores those causal mechanisms.
II.

Individual and Structural Causes of Police Violence in The Wire

Most fictional depictions of police violence on television fall into two camps: an apology
for the violence or the bad apple theory. As noted above, The Wire does present a few bad
apples—Walker, Colicchio, and Herc. Yet through the characters of Carver, Bunk, Kima, Bunny,
and Daniels, we come to see the organizational dysfunctions that produce police violence despite
the decency of the individual officer. As we count them, The Wire depicts four structural causes
of excessive police force: the code of loyalty, a hyper-masculine culture, the War on Drugs, and
an underlying collective action problem.
A. The Police Code of Loyalty
Perhaps because police jobs are high stress and can involve risking one’s life, police have
to depend on each other to an unusual degree, which produces a more intense loyalty than other
professions (other than the military).33 The ideology of American police is that the public cannot
understand the difficulty of the job, but are too quick to judge and blame;34 police believe they
must therefore shield each other from public scrutiny. As a result, police forces have an intense
norm against informing on a fellow officer, the so-called code of silence.35 There is a
corresponding norm of police management: a good commanding officer will protect his officers
from outside scrutiny and discipline.
This is how it is that Daniels can behave as he does when arriving at the scene where
Prez, Herc, and Carver have needlessly provoked a confrontation that resulted in Prez striking
and blinding Kevin Johnston in one eye. Daniels is obviously angry at them; he is distraught
when he shares the incident with his wife and learns that Johnston will lose the eye; later still, he
stubbornly tries to help Johnston. But those genuine feelings do not stop him from advising Prez,
Herc, and Carver explicitly how to lie, how to fabricate a story to escape accountability.
Why does he do this? Because of the entrenched code of loyalty, Daniels would lose the
respect of his officers, and his ability to lead, if he did otherwise. When Daniels’s wife Marla
suggests that he “shoulda hung them” in the series’ second episode, Daniels replies with two
arguments.36 First, “I hang them, I hang myself. I’m the man in charge, remember.”37 Here is the
simplest reason for a cover-up, not limited to police: because the underlings’ misbehavior makes

33

See, e.g., JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 238, 283 (2004); JEROME H. SKOLNICK AND JAMES
J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE USE OF EXCESSIVE FORCE 89, 111, 122 (1993).
34
PETER K. MANNING & JOHN MAANEN, POLICING: A VIEW FROM THE STREET 221–38 (1978) (referring to the
police perception of citizens as suspicious persons, the asshole, and know nothings).
35
See generally TONY COADY, VIOLENCE AND POLICE CULTURE (2000).
36
The Wire: The Detail, supra note 2 (Season 1, Episode 2).
37
Id.
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the boss look bad. But second, Daniels adds: “Besides, you don’t give your people up to IID
[internal affairs]. You don’t do that.”38 Here is the simple statement of the silence that police
loyalty demands. And when in the next episode Ervin Burrell asks him if he knew his men went
into the towers at night without backup, Daniels says, “I tell you yes, I screwed up. I tell you no,
I’m putting my men in the jackpot.”39 He later adds: “I’m defending my own people here, that’s
all.”40 As the police culture defines the job, this is what he must do.
B. A Culture of Hyper-Masculinity
The Wire repeatedly depicts the culture of policing as intensely masculine, one aspect of
which is the need to project power and to dominate every situation.41 The very first episode of
Season One lays out the masculine perspective on how to solve crime in a conversation between
Herc, Carver, and Kima (who is doing paperwork):
Carver: What he means to say is that we are an effective deterrent on the War on Drugs
when we are on the street.
Herc: Fuck the motherfuckers up right?
Carver: Indeed.
Herc: Fuck the paperwork. Collect bodies, split heads.
Carver: Split ‘em wide.
Herc: The Western District way.
Carver: Aight.
Kima: You heroic motherfuckers kill me. Fighting the War on Drugs, one brutality case
at a time.42
Later in the episode, when confronted with the embarrassing fact that the department has no
information on Avon Barksdale, Herc’s response is simple: “I say we go down to the terrace and
fuck some people up.”43 In Episode Two, Herc, Carver, and Prez go to the towers for this
purpose after Carver says, “You got to let these motherfuckers know who you are.”44
This masculine mindset requires massive retaliation in response to assaults of police
officers. After Kima is shot, Burrell says to Daniels, “Send a message. . . . See that it is heard.”45
After a day of kicking in doors, arresting suspects, seizing drugs and guns, and generally pushing
people around, the commissioner says, “today a message has been sent.”46 We see this message
38

Id.
The Wire: The Buys, supra note 3 (Season 1, Episode 3).
40
Id.
41
See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115,
135–38 (2014).
42
The Wire: The Target, supra note 19 (Season 1, Episode 1).
43
Id.
44
The Wire: The Detail, supra note 2 (Season 1, Episode 2).
45
The Wire: The Cost (HBO television broadcast Aug. 11, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 10).
46
Id.
39
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again when Bodie is beaten for striking Detective Mahon. Kima’s participation in the beating is
instructive. When others are attacking Bodie, Kima sprints to the scene from a distance and, at
first glance, a viewer might expect that she intends to intervene to protect Bodie. But in fact she
does the opposite: she begins beating Bodie with her night stick and yells at the other officers to
“hold his arms” so he can’t block the blows. As a woman, Kima is a presumptive outsider, whose
physical prowess is suspect, so it should come as no surprise that she over-complies with the
norm to prove herself. She is accepted as a female police detective only because she impresses
her colleagues by acting like a man.
In this respect, Kima’s same-sex orientation, while a burden in some ways, allows the
men to understand her as being more like them. McNulty tells her that the only other female
officer he knew who was “worth a damn” was also a lesbian.47 Consider the respect Kima earns
from this violence. Herc and Carver later have this conversation in front of Bodie:
Carver: Still draggin’ from the whooping Kima put on him.
Herc: Fucked you up like a cop should, didn’t she?
Carver: That’s one thing about Kima, she put a hurtin’ on you like a man.48
We again see the concern with masculine honor when Bird savagely insults Kima in the
interrogation room, including her sexual orientation. Other suspects mouth off, but there is some
line between ordinary pushing back and serious insult, and Bird crosses it. In front of other
officers, Kima cannot let Bird get away with it, given the norms. So she, Daniels, and Landsman
administer a beating.
C. The War on Drugs
In The Wire, the War on Drugs has a profound negative effect on policing and police
culture. The basic problem is that the war is unwinnable. As Carver puts it in the first episode,
“[y]ou can’t even call this shit a war. . . . Wars end.”49 Given addictive drugs, demand is
inelastic. Given a substantial poor population, there will be supply as others step in to replace
those arrested and incarcerated. Witnesses are scarce. Perhaps the war would still be winnable if
police had the patience and resources to bring down gang leadership expeditiously, but the show
documents the many practical and political obstacles to such success, including the fact that drug
money corrupts politicians.
As a result, routine police work does not involve an officer building the trust of a
community, nor developing human sources of information. Instead, it is about generating
statistics to make it appear the police are winning the unwinnable war. That job does not require
patience or trust, but the physicality of kicking in doors or jumping out on a corner and chasing
down dealers. If politicians or police brass demand a show of “dope on the table,” some quick
47

The Wire: The Buys, supra note 3 (Season 1, Episode 3).
The Wire: The Pager, supra note 6 (Season 1, Episode 5).
49
The Wire: The Target, supra note 19 (Season 1, Episode 1).
48
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street-level undercover operations, “hand to hands,” will work. There is no time for anything
else.
The high frequency of drug busts attracts into policing those who like the physical,
confrontational part of the job, and trains and rewards them for a certain proficiency at it. Two
more factors make the problem worse. One, the drug trade is violent, as inevitably occurs when
traffickers cannot rely on the law to protect them from force or fraud. Two, drug traffickers are
drawn from the poor of the city, who have the least opportunities for lawful employment. The
poor tend disproportionately to be composed of racial minorities, in Baltimore, AfricanAmericans. So the drug war draws police into constant physical confrontations with young and
poor African-Americans, precisely the population for which those kicking in doors are most
likely to demonize and dehumanize, and for which violence has the least political penalty, and
sometimes a political reward.
In Season Three, Bunny Colvin repeatedly articulates the view that the drug war has
ruined policing because physically aggressive street-level enforcement disrupts the work of
building police-community relationships. All of this is the background for why Bunny
shockingly authorizes unlawful violence. Frustrated beyond endurance by the drug war, he
attempts to set up a legalized drug zone. But his experiment is stymied before it can begin by the
fact that the mid-level drug dealers won’t send their “corner boys” to Hamsterdam because they
don’t trust police promises of non-enforcement (nor is there any reason for them to trust police).
Desperate to de-escalate the drug war, and lower violence, he sees no other way to get started
except to use violence. The end does not justify the means, but it does explain how a decent
person rationalizes the use of violence as a means.
D. A Collective Action Problem
Finally, we come to the most abstract cause of police violence, which might be
understood as the basic background condition for the causes already noted: a gap between what
is good for the police force as a whole and what is good for the individual officer.
We agree with the claims made by a well-known academic literature on procedural
justice that a police force as a whole (and the public) benefit from public respect for and trust in
police.50 The greater the respect and trust, the more the public cooperates with and assists the
police, as by reporting crime and serving as witnesses, or simply not running when an officer

50

TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2013); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Jacinta M. Gau, Procedural Justice and Police Legitimacy: A
Test of Measurement and Structure, 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 187 (2014); Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance:
Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295 (2016); Stephen J. Schulhofer et al.,
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66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153 (2003);

10

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3201265
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3201265

approaches. The police earn that trust and respect by providing citizens with procedural justice,
meaning that the police treat citizens fairly and with respect, at the very least by avoiding
violence where possible and otherwise minimizing its use. Thus, to a police department, the
overall costs of procedural justice are more than offset by the benefits. The force collectively
benefits more from gaining the respect and cooperation of the citizenry than from indulging the
desire of individual officers to be rude and excessively aggressive.
But what is true of the collective is not necessarily true of the individual. In an interaction
with a citizen, an officer experiences the costs more than the benefits. Treating someone fairly
and with respect need not and should not be costly, of course. But it will be for an officer who is
tired or stressed, or who actually does not respect the citizen at issue, if not from simple bigotry,
then perhaps because he feels he is not receiving the respect he deserves from the citizen. To
avoid unnecessary force, the officer needs to restrain and control his irritation or anger, and his
impatience, which make the officer want to use violence. The officer incurs all the costs of this
effort, but not the benefit, because the future cooperation and assistance of citizens is spread to
the entire department.
One might think that the close-knit group of police officers would be able to solve this
classic collective action problem with an appropriate norm of civil behavior towards citizens.
This probably occurs in some departments. But there is no guarantee. In particular, the norm of
loyalty discussed above may block any such civility norm because its enforcement would entail
disclosing that another officer had violated it. The code of silence that compels police to cover
up the misconduct of fellow officers to prevent outside accountability spills over into protecting
fellow officers from internal accountability, thus preventing the force from solving its own
collective action problem.51
We can state the point with an example. It is collectively good for the police force if
suspects do not flee. Most officers don’t want to chase someone, exerting themselves and risking
injury. Whenever an officer humiliates or injures a suspect who has not fled, that creates an
incentive for future suspects to flee. Yet while the officer gets whatever benefit he gets from
being rude or violent, he spreads the costs to all the officers in the force, the ones who have to
chase fleeing suspects in the future. It is thus good for the force for the officer refrain from using
force, but that is not necessarily what the individual officer will want to do.
A scene with Carver illustrates. He stands on a police car in Season Three, and threatens
to beat a very young suspect who has successfully evaded a large number of officers. Carver
yells a proposal to the hiding suspect that the officers will beat him if he fails to turn himself in
and they find him later, but they will not beat him if he turns himself in.52 We don’t learn

51

See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 421–24
(1997) (describing how a police norm of silence can be enforced up to levels that harm a police force).
52
The Wire: Time After Time, supra note 30 (Season 3, Episode 1) (“If you march your ass out here right now and
put the bracelets on, we will not kick the living shit out of you. But if you make us go into them weeds for you, or if
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whether the suspect turned himself in or was caught, but we do learn that he was beaten—a few
scenes later, he appears in the precinct house with facial injuries.53 Whichever officer it was who
administered the beating, he may have gained from indulging a desire to retaliate against a
juvenile who embarrassed the police by successfully fleeing for a while. But it would have been
better for the department for the officers to keep their word, so future suspects would have less
reason to flee.
In conclusion, The Wire does not present police violence merely as the result of a few
bad apples, but as a part of ever-present structural issues that incentivize police to act this way.
III.

Suggestions for Reform

As the previous Part indicates, the problem of police violence is more structural and
systematic than the mere existence of a few bad apples on the force. Certainly, every police force
should identify and fire those officers who engage in unlawful acts of brutality against citizens
(and they should be prosecuted as well). But while removing the bad apples from the force
should reduce police brutality, it would not end it. Other police would continue to engage in the
same type of violence, for reasons other than sadism and a desire to exert power. More
importantly, the institutional culture and structure of the police force would continue to produce
officers who engage in acts of unlawful violence. Accordingly, disciplining and firing officers
who engage in unlawful violence is a starting point but not an endpoint. In this Part, we discuss
other possible solutions to the problem of police violence. We offer one suggestion to match
each of the causal mechanisms we described in Part II.
A.

The Police Code of Loyalty

Organization-wide norms such as the police code of loyalty can be extraordinarily
difficult or impossible to dislodge.54 The problem is that the norm is self-reinforcing, as more
senior police officers indoctrinate subsequent generations of younger officers in the same norms.
Rather than attempting to alter this code from the inside, we recommend attacking it from the
outside. Police departments and prosecutors’ offices should aggressively investigate and
prosecute acts of police misconduct, and then supplement this step by also pursuing police
officers who help to cover up misconduct. That is, they should try to break the code of loyalty by
substantially raising the costs of stonewalling or lying to investigators.

you make us come back out here tomorrow night, catch you on a corner, I swear to fucking Christ, we will beat you
longer and harder than you beat your own dick!”).
53
Id. The suspect has a butterfly bandage above his eye and complains that the police “whooped my ass.” Herc
replies: “The Western District way.”
54
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
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One initial step, which most major police departments have already adopted, is to have an
independent internal affairs department, outside of the normal police hierarchy, that is charged
with investigating charges of police misconduct. Separating these investigators from the normal
police department structure should reduce the influence of the police code of loyalty and permit
the investigators to bring charges in cases where officers within the chain of command would
normally stay their hands.
As a stark example of what not to do, consider the recent United States Department of
Justice Report (“Report”) on the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”).55 The Report noted that
the Mayor of Chicago and the President of the police union conceded the existence of a “code of
silence” within the CPD.56 A cause and symptom of that code was the fact that investigators of
police misconduct did not enforce the obligation to be truthful with investigators. “Rather than
aggressively enforcing and seeking discharge for violations of CPD’s Rule 14, which prohibits
making false statements, enforcement in this area is rarely taken seriously and is largely
ignored.”57 Tellingly for the code of silence, investigators failed to
hold witness officers responsible for covering up misconduct of others. . . .
Indeed, our investigation revealed that there were only 98 Rule 14 charges
sustained over the last five years. Only one of these sustained cases was initiated
by IPRA [the Independent Police Review Authority] against an officer witness
who IPRA discovered lied to cover up misconduct of another. Moreover, in many
of the cases where Rule 14 charges were brought and sustained against accused
officers for lying, the discipline imposed was less than discharge. Almost onethird of all the sustained Rule 14 cases had a recommended punishment of 25-day
suspension or less, and some of the discharge recommendations were reduced or
overturned on appeal. . . .
Not only are Rule 14 investigations not encouraged, but past IPRA
leadership prohibited investigators from initiating such Rule 14 investigations
without obtaining approval from the IPRA Chief Administrator, sending a strong
message to investigators not to expand their investigations into collateral Rule 14
charges. Such Rule 14 requests required a de facto higher standard of proof and
were rarely approved. . . .
Furthermore, even in the rare case where a Rule 14 charge is made and
results in a sustained finding, officers face little risk that such finding will impact
their ability to testify in criminal cases in support of the prosecution. We learned
in our investigation that there is no system in place to ensure that all officer
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., INVESTIGATION
OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download
55

[https://perma.cc/AV2R-BH37].
56
Id. at 75.
57
Id.
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disciplinary findings bearing on credibility, including Rule 14 findings, are
supplied to the State’s Attorney’s Office and criminal defendants, even though
this is required under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). . . .58
To some extent, Chicago has addressed these concerns in the creation of the Civilian Office of
Police Accountability (“COPA”) to replace IPRA, though it is too soon to measure any
improvement.59 Yet the DOJ report implies some obvious structural solutions to the code of
silence: diligently investigate false statements by police witnesses, significantly punish those
who lie, and disclose evidence of lying to criminal defendants (which is its own sanction as it is a
career detriment not to be able to testify credibly).
In The Wire, by contrast, the Internal Investigations Division (“IID”) is not even as good
as IPRA or COPA. While IPRA and COPA are at least independent, IID is located within the
police department, and the head of that division reports to the head of the Criminal Investigations
Division, the Deputy Commissioner for Operations, and the Commissioner himself. The Wire
depicts the head of IID as an agent of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner for
Operations, often to the detriment of officers who incur the wrath of the higher-ups. (In one
notable scene, detectives refer to him as the “angel of death.”)60 It is thus a simple matter for
police officials to barter an arrangement that protects Prez when convenient and ends Herc’s
career when that becomes politically expedient.
Of course, independent investigative units such as COPA are not enough—there must be
independent decision-makers in prosecutors’ offices as well. County and state prosecutors rely
upon cooperation from the police when prosecuting criminal defendants, and so they are often
just as reluctant to prosecute officers for wrongdoing as police are to investigate that
wrongdoing. Ideally, then, states and municipalities would have standing independent counsel
who are empowered to investigate and prosecute police misconduct whenever it arises. Here,
most jurisdictions fall well short. Many have legal provisions that allow for the appointment of
special prosecutors in particular cases, but the same code of loyalty that prevents prosecutors
from aggressively pursuing police misconduct weighs against any decision to appoint a special
prosecutor as well.
Finally, it is particularly important that prosecutors charge not only the police officer who
has engaged in the misconduct, but any officer who helped cover up the initial officer’s actions,
with the crimes of perjury or obstruction of justice. Doing so would significantly raise the costs
of abiding by the police code of loyalty and convince police to cooperate with investigations
rather than risk their own careers and freedom. Such prosecutions are generally rare, but there
58

Id. at 76–77 (emphasis added).
CIVILIAN OFF. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2018), http://www.chicagocopa.org/ [https://perma.cc/UY3N-ZBR3].
60
The Wire: Lessons (HBO television broadcast July 28, 2002) (Season 1, Episode 8).
59
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are notable exceptions. For instance, three of the Chicago police officers who helped cover up
the shooting of Laquan McDonald have been indicted for conspiracy and obstruction of justice.61
At the same time, the statement by the special prosecutor who brought the indictments is telling.
She explained: “The indictment makes clear that these defendants did more than merely obey an
unofficial ‘code of silence,’ rather it alleges that they lied about what occurred to prevent
independent criminal investigators from learning the truth.”62 We must reach a point at which
abiding by even the “mere” code of silence, and not just overt lying, can place a police officer in
danger of losing his or her job.
B.

The Culture of Masculinity

As we described above, police forces are afflicted by a sometimes toxic culture of
masculinity. Officers feel the need to demonstrate their dominance over the population they are
meant to serve. Any slight, no matter how small, can be taken as a challenge to a police officer’s
authority and is liable to be met with violence. As we noted above, culture is notoriously sticky,
and institutions can tend to attract new members who value the existing organizational culture.63
Altering police culture will not be easy and will not happen quickly. However, one potential
approach might be for police forces to hire more female police officers. This was the
recommendation of a commission headed by Warren Christopher that was tasked with studying
and responding to the riots that broke out in Los Angeles following the acquittal of several Los
Angeles police in the beating of Rodney King.64 The Christopher Commission found that a
culture of extreme masculinity within the Los Angeles police department was one of the driving
forces behind police violence, and it recommended hiring more female officers as one potential
solution.65
The Wire paints a nuanced picture of the effects of female officers on the force. The Wire
demonstrates that female officers can be as brutal as their male counterparts. Kima illustrates this
possibility. Because she feels pressured to prove herself as an equal in this male-dominated
culture, she overcompensates by being quick to resort to excessive force. Note again that Herc
and Carver specifically praise Kima by saying that she can beat a suspect “like a man.” (On the
other hand, it is Kima who has the moral courage to break the code of silence in Season Five
61

3 Cops Indicted for Obstruction of Justice in Laquan McDonald Shooting, CBS CHI. (June 27, 2017),
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2017/06/27/laquan-mcdonald-officers-indicted-obstruction-of-justice/
[https://perma.cc/NWZ5-EX2V].
62
Id.
63
Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, Punitive Police: Agency Costs, Law Enforcement, and Criminal
Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016).
64
INDEP. COMM. ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T, REPORT OF THE INDEP. COMM. ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP’T (1991),
https://archive.org/details/ChristopherCommissionLAPD [https://perma.cc/TVD7-766Z] [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION REPORT]; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLICING, HIRING AND RETAINING MORE WOMEN: THE
ADVANTAGES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 4 (2003) (suggesting that female police officers would be less
confrontational and authoritarian).
65
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 64.
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when she turns in Freamon and McNulty for their fraudulent creation of a serial killer.) In any
event, The Wire also gives us Beadie Russell, who exemplifies the ideal of an officer who feels
no compulsion to prove herself through violence. The Wire also highlights the importance of
peer groups. It is perhaps no coincidence that Beadie becomes acculturated to the Baltimore
police force through Freamon, Bunk, and McNulty, none of whom engages in a single act of
unlawful violence throughout the entire show. Had her initial assignment been to the narcotics
division or a police district, where violence is rampant, she might have learned different
behaviors.
In fact, there is substantial research to support The Wire’s portrayal of women in police
forces. One study on female police officers in Canada revealed that most women felt significant
pressure to conform their behavior to fit masculine norms.66 Those police who identified
themselves as “one of the guys” reported greater job satisfaction and better career outcomes.67
Research on the Israeli and Swedish militaries, which are similarly integrated on the basis of
gender, revealed similar findings.68 These effects are reinforced through police training, which
tends to reinforce the aggressive, “masculine” aspects of the job.69 Accordingly, the job of police
officer will likely be most attractive to women who favor the existing, aggressive culture.70 And
any person who is hired—male or female—will tend to become socialized toward the use of
violence as a means of asserting dominance.
The Wire thus suggests that hiring more female police officers will not be an automatic
panacea. If they wish to alter the culture of extreme masculinity, police forces will have to take
additional steps. One such measure would be to alter the way in which officers are trained,
emphasizing nonviolent conflict resolution over force. Another would be to focus on the
personalities of applicants to the police force and attempt to select for officers who will not be
quick to resort to force. Finally, diversifying police forces to include more women might

Lesley J. Bikos, “I Took the Blue Pill” The Effect of the Hegemonic Masculine Police Culture on Canadian Police
women’s Identities (July 2016) (unpublished M.A. Research Paper, Western University) (on file with Western
Libraries, Western University), https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/sociology_masrp/7/ [https://perma.cc/Q62S-DET3].
67
Id.
68
Mimmi Granat, "They Are More Afraid of Losing Women Than of Having Women": How the Structural
Transformation of the Swedish Armed Forces has Affected the Experience for Female Recruits (2016) (unpublished
Master’s thesis, Swedish Defence University) (on file with author), http://www.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A937411&dswid=8877 [https://perma.cc/BPU3-WXBQ]; Orna SassonLevy & Sarit Amram-Katz, Gender Integration in Israeli Officer Training: Degendering and Regendering the
Military, 33 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y, 105 (2007).
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Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, ‘There Oughtta Be a Law Against Bitches’: Masculinity Lessons in Police
Academy Training, 9 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 439, 446–54 (2002); Michael F. Aiello, Policing the Masculine
Frontier: Cultural Criminological Analysis of the Gendered Performance of Policing, 10 CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE
59, 72–74 (2014).
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See Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, & Richard H. McAdams, Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (2016) (arguing that police with punitive tendencies
will select into police forces).
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nonetheless be an improvement on the status quo.71 Police departments should take their cues
from The Wire regarding the importance of peer groups and hire a substantial numbers of female
officers, enough to constitute a critical mass within the force as a whole, or at least some
subunits. If enough officers are concentrated within particular units of the police force, they
might have the effect of shifting the norms that lead police to resort to violence.
C.

The War on Drugs

If the War on Drugs is having pernicious effects on policing and police behavior, an
obvious potential response is to end the war. That, however, is easier said than done. The Wire
aptly demonstrates the futility of trying to “prevail” against drug dealers and drug use.
At the same time, it offers an alternative: de-penalization, which is to say, ceasing to
arrest and incarcerate individuals involved in the sale and consumption of drugs. The model is
Hamsterdam, Bunny Colvin’s experiment in allowing dealers and users free rein within limited
geographic areas of the city. The Wire suggests that Hamsterdam offers a way forward in the
never-ending fight against drugs, and one that would lead to a reduction in police violence. At
the same time, the show depicts the tradeoffs involved in such a step: rampant drug use and an
accompanying public health crisis. As John Bronsteen explains in another paper in this volume,
the costs from de-penalizing drug use might easily outstrip the benefits.72
If victory in the War on Drugs is impossible, and surrender is too costly, what then? One
approach might be to simply lower expectations. As we have described, police violence is driven
in part by ongoing political demands for progress in the War on Drugs—more arrests, less crime,
fewer dealers on the corners, etc. These demands are impossible to meet, and this causes the
police to resort to unlawful violence. The focus on the War on Drugs to the exclusion of other
crimes also creates incentives for individuals who enjoy violence to join the police force. It
might be possible to alter this dynamic if, instead, the public—and thus politicians as well—
came to understand that the drug trade is an unavoidable background signal in American life. If
police departments were not constantly under pressure to fight and win the drug war, they might
not find themselves so frequently in physical confrontations with drug dealers and drug users.
And even if the police did not give up entirely on policing the drug trade, as Bunny’s officers do
in Season Three, the police department might nonetheless shift its emphasis subtly in the
direction of other crimes and other skills. It might attract, hire, and train police officers who are
more capable of solving burglaries and robberies, rather than merely “collect bodies, split
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heads,” as Herc puts it.73 This is admittedly at best only a partial solution. But in the face of an
unwinnable war, a partial solution may be all that is possible.

D.

Collective Action Problems

Finally, as we noted, police forces are beset by a particularly intractable form of
collective action problem. Even though it is in the police force’s interest (and society’s interest)
that citizens be treated with respect and not subjected to unlawful violence, any individual officer
might believe it is in his own interest to do the opposite. The most obvious (and perhaps best)
solution to this collective action problem is simply to sanction police officers who engage in
unlawful violence. They should be suspended, fired, and in many cases prosecuted criminally.
Yet, as The Wire demonstrates and as much research has shown, there are many practical
impediments to successfully and comprehensively implementing such a plan.74 Police will cover
up one another’s misdeeds, and they are protected by union contracts and laws that make it
difficult to impose punitive sanctions on them for unlawful behavior. It is at least worth
considering supplemental approaches.
One such approach might be to use carrots, rather than sticks, to induce positive police
behavior. Perhaps each police officer might be offered a monthly behavioral bonus, some
fraction of that officer’s salary. Each time a citizen swears out a complaint accusing the police
officer of using excessive force, that monthly bonus is reduced by a fixed amount—regardless of
whether or not the citizen complaint is upheld or found to have merit.75 The effect would be to
align individual officer incentives with the incentives of the police force as a whole, almost as if
they held stock options pegged to the value of the institution. Each time an officer engages in
unlawful or excessive use of force, the officer stands to lose a small amount of money at
minimum, just as the police force is harmed to some degree. In addition, by offering the bonus
up front and then reducing it when there was a complaint, police would likely feel as they had
already earned the bonus and would be reluctant to surrender it. The system would exploit the
tendency toward loss aversion: individuals tend to behave in risk-averse fashion when they feel
as though they have something to lose. Here, that risk aversion should manifest itself through
police efforts to engage in any behavior that might trigger a civilian complaint.76
73
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Small monetary fines might seem like weak beer in the face of the social scourge that is
police violence. We do not dispute that characterization, and we certainly do not believe that this
system of bonuses and fines should displace or lessen efforts to fire or imprison bad police. Our
point is merely that there may be value in attempting to reward police who treat citizens with
respect, above and beyond sanctioning those who engage in unlawful violence. Belts are nice,
but suspenders never hurt.
IV. Conclusion
For years, scholars, activists, and commentators have debated whether the problem of
unlawful police brutality is traceable merely to a few bad apples, or whether it represents more
systemic or structural problems within American police forces. The Wire comes down firmly on
the structural side of this debate. It demonstrates how the norms and codes of policing can drive
even “good” police officers to do terrible things to criminal suspects. And it lays bare the
collective action problem at the heart of police departments. In these respects, The Wire was a
television show before its time. The Wire began describing the deeply rooted problem of police
brutality in its first episodes, which aired in the summer of 2002. It was not until twelve years
later, the summer of 2014, when the death of Michael Brown and the Black Lives Matter
movement thrust these issues before the general public in a way that could no longer be ignored.
It is not in the nature of The Wire to suggest a way forward; The Wire is not a hopeful
show. Nonetheless, we believe that it is possible to combat the toxic cultures of masculinity and
loyalty, the collective action problem, and the unceasing War on Drugs that lie at the heart of
systemic police brutality. The solutions will be politically difficult, and it is entirely possible that
we will continue to lack the political will to achieve them. But as activists such as DeRay
Mckesson—this Symposium’s keynote speaker—continue to mobilize and organize for change,
they seem nearer than at any point in the sixteen years since The Wire first aired.

an attempt to dissuade those police officers from properly doing their jobs. We have doubts that even the most
sophisticated criminal organizations would take such a step and place their members in such direct contact with the
police, but such prospects cannot be ruled out. If this became a serious problem, police departments might need to
deploy a more complicated algorithm to determine which complaints to credit and which to ignore.
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